With the advances of data mining and the pervasiveness of cloud computing, online medical diagnosis service has been extensively applied in e-heathcare field, and brought great conveniences to people's life. However, due to the insufficient data sharing among healthcare centers under the security and privacy concerns of medical information, the flourish of online medical diagnosis service still faces many severe challenges including diagnostic accuracy issues. In this paper, in order to address the security issues and improve the accuracy of online medical diagnosis service, we propose a new privacy-preserving collaborative model learning scheme with skyline computation, called PCML. With PCML, healthcare centers can securely learn a global diagnosis model with their local diagnosis models in the assistance of cloud, and the sensitive medical data of each healthcare center is well protected. Specifically, with a secure multi-party vector comparison algorithm (SMVC), all local diagnosis models are encrypted by their owners before being sent to the cloud, and can be directly operated without decryption. Detailed security analysis shows that PCML can resist security threats in the semi-honest model. Moreover, PCML is implemented with medical datasets from UCI machine learning repository, and extensive simulation results demonstrate that PCML is efficient and can be implemented effectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the online medical diagnosis system [1] , which can provide medical diagnosis service anywhere and anytime, has attracted considerable interest. Compared with traditional treatment methods, online medical diagnosis is more flexible and convenient since it breaks the geographical restriction, and reduces the waiting time of seeing doctors [2] - [6] . To predict hidden diseases from collected medical data, many data mining techniques have been developed for e-healthcare system in recent years. For example, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Rentao Gu . skyline computation [7] , which returns a set of interesting points from a potentially huge data space, can be appropriately used in medical data analyzing and disease classification [6] . Specifically, with collected medical data, healthcare centers can generate diagnosis models via medical data mining with skyline query, which assists them in offering online medical diagnosis services, and allows users to check their health conditions expediently.
Unfortunately, in traditional online medical system, the medical data are commonly stored distributively in different healthcare centers, and a sole healthcare center collecting only a small set of medical data cannot generate a skyline diagnosis model accurate enough [8] , [9] . For example, consider the scenario shown in Fig. 1 , when a user accesses online medical diagnosis services from multiple healcare centers, due to the limitation of diagnosis model accuracy, healthcare centers may not be able to diagnose diseases accurately, which will bring bewilderment to the user. Thus, healthcare centers expect to learn a more accurate global diagnosis model collaboratively with their local medical information (i.e., local skyline diagnosis models) for offering better services.
However, owing to the data security issues, there are still many difficulties lying ahead the collaborative model learning among multiple healthcare centers [10] - [13] . In general, local skyline diagnosis models take large resources of healthcare centers to generate, and are commonly regarded as the trade secrets. Disclosure of these private information may bring an economic loss directly. As a result, healthcare centers are reluctant to contribute their local skyline diagnosis models. Therefore, it is of great importance to develop a privacy-preserving collaborative model learning scheme over multiple healthcare centers for online medical diagnosis system.
To address the above-mentioned challenges, some distributed skyline computation [14] , [15] and privacypreserving techniques [4] , [16] have been proposed. Individually, distributed skyline computation techniques achieve the skyline query distributively, but these techniques mainly focus on searching the set of interesting skyline points from the distributed dataset, while not aware how to apply skyline computation in online medical diagnosis system to perform range query. Furthermore, the private information of data owners is not protected in these techniques. To address the data security issues, many privacy-preserving techniques, such as homomorphic encryption [16] and anonymity techniques [4] are proposed to achieve data security. Homomorphic encryption allows direct operations over ciphertexts, which can achieve accurate operation results on encrypted data However, most of them contain massive, complicated arithmetical operations, which brings considerable computation overhead. Anonymity techniques are extensively used in private information protection, which blurs private data into a cloaked space to protect the sensitive information, but it brings heavy communication overhead. The above-mentioned techniques can resolve the existing issues to some degree, but they are hard to be deployed in online medical diagnosis system.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving collaborative model learning scheme with skyline computation, named PCML. With PCML, multiple healthcare centers can learn a global diagnosis model with their local skyline diagnosis models in the assistance of cloud, while the private local diagnosis models of healthcare centers can be well protected. Meanwhile, the learned global model is also kept confidential from the cloud. Individually, the main contributions of this paper are fourfold.
• First, PCML addresses the privacy and data security issues of collaborative model learning for skyline computation. With PCML, the private local skyline diagnosis models of healthcare centers are encrypted with a modified paillier cryptosystem, and are operated without decryption. Therefore, the sensitive medical information of healthcare centers can be well protected, meanwhile, the confidentiality of the final global diagnosis model is ensured.
• Second, PCML achieves collaborative model learning accurately. To achieve the quality of online medical diagnosis service, we construct a secure multi-party vector comparison (SMVC) algorithm based on paillier cryptosystem with secret sharing, which supports lossless collaborative model learning while protecting healthcare centers' privacy.
• Third, PCML accomplishes the fault-tolerant mechanism for collaborative model learning. In the real environment, the servers of healthcare centers may crash due to some irresistible factors (such as physical damage, malicious attacks). With threshold decryption technique, PCML achieves that even if a few healthcare centers are crashed, the global model can also be calculated correctly.
• Fourth, PCML is efficient regarding computation complexity and communication overhead. Based on manhattan distance, the skyline points can be extracted easily from datasets, which improve the efficiency of collaborative model learning. Moreover, we test PCML through PC with a real medical dataset to evaluate its effectiveness. Extensive results show that PCML is efficient and can be implemented effectively. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we formalize the system model, security requirements, and identify our design goal. In section III, we review the skyline computation, bilinear pairing, and paillier cryptosystem as the preliminaries. Then, we propose our PCML in section IV, followed by the security analysis and performance evaluation in section V and section VI, respectively. We also review some related works in section VII. Finally, we draw our conclusions in section VIII.
II. MODELS AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we formalize the system model and security requirements.
A. SYSTEM MODEL In our system model, we mainly focus on how to provide privacy-preserving collaborative model learning for online medical diagnosis system. Each healthcare center is equipped with a PC, which can connect with other healthcare centers and the cloud. Specifically, the system consists of three parts: 1) trusted authority (TA); 2) healthcare centers (HCs) and 3) cloud server (CS). As shown in Fig. 2 . • TA is a trusted authority (i.e., a government department), which bootstraps the system initialization through generating the system parameters, and distributing keys for HCs and CS.
• HCs = {HC 1 , · · · , HC n } is a set of n healthcare centers. In our system, each HC i ∈ HCs owns a local skyline diagnosis model built upon the collected clinical datasets, and shares its encrypted local skyline diagnosis model for obtaining a more precise global diagnosis model via cooperative computing with other HCs and CS.
• CS is a cloud server which assists healthcare centers to generate global skyline diagnosis model. CS is responsible for aggregating the encrypted local diagnosis models, and generating the final global diagnosis model via cooperative computing with HCs. In our system, CS undertakes the most calculations during the collaborative model learning process.
B. THREATEN MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENT
In our threaten model, we consider that CS and HCs are honest-but-curious [17] . Specifically, CS (1) stores the encrypted local skyline diagnosis models of HCs without tampering them; (2) honestly executes the operations of PCML, and returns the collaborative model learning result reliably; and (3) tries to retrieve the underlying plaintext of local skyline diagnosis models of HCs. In addition, each HC (1) does not send false information;
(2) tries to analyze other HCs' local skyline diagnosis models during the cooperative computing process. Considering above security issues, the following security requirements should be satisfied.
• Privacy: Protecting the privacy of each HC's local skyline diagnosis model. Concretely, during the collaborative model learning process, every HC's local skyline diagnosis model cannot be leaked to CS and other HCs.
• Confidentiality: Protecting the learned global diagnosis model from the cloud. Specifically, after the collaborative model learning process, the golbal diagnosis model can only be retrieved by HCs.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the skyline computation and its additivity property [18] , skyline diagnosis model [6] , and paillier cryptosystem [19] . These will serve as the basis of our PCML.
A. SKYLINE COMPUTATION AND ADDITIVITY PROPERTY 1) SKYLINE COMPUTATION
Given a dataset S in m-dimensional space, and a point P ∈ S can be represented as a vector P = {p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n }. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the p i in any dimension i is greater or equal to zero (p i ≥ 0). Definition 1 (Skyline Computation): A point P ∈ S is said to dominate another point Q ∈ S, represented by P ≺ Q, if it satisfies the following conditions: 1) For every dimension i, p i ≤ q i . 2) At least there exists one dimension j such that p j < q j . The skyline set is a set of points SKY (S) ⊆ S that are not dominated by any other points. The points in SKY (S) are called skyline points.
2) ADDITIVITY PROPERTY
Given a dataset S and n datasets such that S = S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ · · · ∪ S n , the additivity of skyline computation can be represented as SKY (S) = SKY (SKY (S 1 ) ∪ SKY (S 2 ) ∪ · · · ∪ SKY (S n )). Note that if there are same points in SKY (S i ), i = i, · · · , n, reserve one of them and delete the extra points. Then, the above equation implies the two following events are equivalent: 1) Skyline computation is calculated over the union of the n datasets. 2) Skyline computation is firstly calculated over each dataset to generate local skyline set, and then calculated over the union of local skyline sets.
Due to the additivity of skyline computation, the skyline query can be processed in a distributed method. As shown in Fig. 3 , assume two datasets S 1 and S 2 stored in different data owners. The additivity of the skyline computation ensures that it is sufficient to take into account only the skyline points SKY (S 1 ) (a, b, c, d) and SKY (S 2 ) (e, f , g) to retrieve the global skyline points of the dataset SKY (S) = SKY (S1 ∪ S2) (a, e, b, g, d) . This is because no other points can be part of the global skyline points since they are dominated by at least one point of SKY (S 1 ) or SKY (S 2 ), and the dominance relation is transitive. 
B. SKYLINE DIAGNOSIS MODEL
From a data set S, it can be seen that the skyline points SKY (S) represents the boundary of S. Through modifying the size relationship of elements in each dimension between two vector, we can define positive and negative skyline points, which present the lower boundary and upper boundary, respectively. Therefore, the skyline computation can be modified to a classifier via determining whether a tested point is within the range enclosed by the upper and lower boundaries. Then, given a medical case dataset, a disease classifier can be constructed as follows.
Assume that the medical case dataset S in m-dimensional space with cardinality n, P and Q are two different points in S .
Definition 2 (Positive Skyline): P is said to positive dominated Q, represented by P Q, if it satisfies following conditions, which are the same as P ≺ Q: 1) For every dimension i, p i ≤ q i . 2) At least there exists one dimension j such that p j < q j .
Definition 3 (Negative Skyline): P is said to negative dominated Q, represented by P Q, if it satisfies the following conditions: 1) For every dimension i, p i ≥ q i . 2) At least there exists one dimension j such that p j > q j .
Based on above definitions, the positive points of medical dataset S , PSKY (S ), and the negative points of medical dataset S , NSKY (S ) can be calculated to construct the skyline diagnosis model. Suppose that a medical query information is presented by a point C, if C is positive dominated by at least on point in PSKY (S), and is negative dominated by at least one point in NSKY (S), it can be concluded that the diagnosis result of C is positive.
C. PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM
Paillier cryptosystem is a widely used additive homomorphic encryption. The detail is presented as the following three functions.
1) Key Generation: (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(κ). Choose two big primes p, q, and computes N = pq, λ = lcm(p − 1, q−1). Then, select a random g ∈ Z * N 2 such that gcd(L(g λ mod N 2 ), N ) = 1, where L(x) = (x − 1)/N . The public key and the private key are pk = (N , g) and sk = λ, respectively.
2) Encryption:
, where E(·) presents the encryption function of paillier. Let m ∈ Z N be a plaintext and r ∈ Z N be a random number. The ciphertext is given by
The homomorphism of paillier cryptosystem: For any m 1 , m 2 , r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z N , we have additive and multiple homomorphism as follows.
[
IV. PROPOSED PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEME
In this section, we present our PCML scheme, which mainly consists of four phases: 1) system initialization; 2) local diagnosis model encryption; 3) collaborative model learning; and 4) collaborative learned result reading. The overview of PCML is described in Fig. 4 . At first, TA generates system parameters, calculates the public key PK and corresponding private key SK of paillier cryptosystem, and splits the private key SK into multiple parts for HCs and CS to achieve threshold decryption. Then, HCs encrypt their local skyline diagnosis models, which will be submitted to CS later. CS executes cooperative computing with HCs to obtain the collaborative learned result, and send the result to HCs. Finally, HCs can obtain the global skyline diagnosis model via cooperative decrypting the learned result. To describe PCML more clear, we give the description of used notations in Table 1 . 
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
During the system initialization phase, TA generates the system parameters, and splits the secret key SK of paillier cryptosystem for CS and HCs. TA first chooses a security parameter α and two large safe prime numbers p, q, where |p| = |q| = α, and computes N = pq, λ = lcm(p−1, q−1). Then, TA chooses a generator g of order (p − 1)(q − 1)/2, such as g = −a 2N , where a is a random number in Z * N 2 (for simplicity we denote g = 1 + N ). The public key is PK = N , and the corresponding private key
Finally, let α 0 , α 1 , · · · , α n be n + 1 distinct nonzero integers satisfying |ε| ≤ N /2, where ε = (max{α 0 , α 1 , · · · , α n } − min{α 0 , α 1 , · · · , α n })!, TA can splits the private key SK into n+1 parts through computing q(α i ). TA publishes the system parameters < g, PK , η, α 1 , α 2 , · · · , α n , ε >.
The private key SK is splitted to n + 1 distributed secret keys for HCs and CS. Then, each HC i ∈ HCs requests TA for its distributed secret key sk H i = q(α i ). Similarly, CS requests TA for its distributed secret key sk C = q(α 0 ).
B. LOCAL DIAGNOSIS MODEL ENCRYPTION
In this phase, in order to achieve the privacy of local skyline diagnosis models, every HC i encrypts its original medical data before sending to CS.
Specifically, assume that the clinical dataset with m-dimensional, and the local skyline diagnosis model of HC i are S i , and LM i , respectively. Referring to Section 3.
In detail, LM i can be represented with a matrix as follows.
Then, HC i chooses random numbers r ijk ∈ Z N (where i is the ID of HC i , j = 1, · · · , t, k = 1, · · · , m), and executes the following operations to encrypt each element in LM i with the public key PK = N .
Moreover, HC i computes the manhattan distance between the origin and each vector in LM i as follows
After this, HC i can obtain the encrypted local skyline diagnosis model
, and the manhattan distances MDP i = (mdp i1 , · · · , mdp it ). Finally, HC i submits < EM i ||MDP i > to CS.
C. COLLABORATIVE MODEL LEARNING
After receiving total n encrypted encrypted local diagnosis model packet < EM i ||MDP i >, for i = 1, · · · , n. CS is responsible for extracting the positive and negative skyline points from EM i , i = i, · · · , n. Concretely, the following operations will be executed.
• Step-1: Encrypted Vectors Aggregation
Assume that each EM i has t skyline points, CS first aggregates MDP 1 , · · · , MDP n to obtain MDP = (mdp 11 , · · · , mdp nt ). Then, CS marks the vectors, which is corresponding to the minimum and maximum in (mdp 11 , · · · , mdp nt ), as Min − p and Max − p, respectively.
For simplify, we take extracting the positive points from EM i , i = i, · · · , n as an example. CS selects two random numbers r c , r c ∈ Z N satisfying
) is a vector in EM i , and each EM i has s positive points. Then, for each vector
where k = 1, · · · , m and j = 1, · · · , t. After this, CS obtains the aggregated vectors AEP i j = (acp i j 1 , · · · , acp i j m ) and its partially decryption AEP
i j m ). Then, CS executes π(AEP i j ) and π(AEP (CS) i j ) to make the order of elements in AEP i j and AEP (CS) i j chaotic. Moreover, CS computes AEP = (AEP 11 , · · · , AEP (n−1)s ) and AEP (CS) = (AEP (CS) 11 , · · · , AEP (CS) (n−1)s ). Similarly, CS executes π (AEP) and π (AEP (CS) ) to make the order of vectors in AEP and AEP (CS) chaotic.
Finally, CS sends < AEP > to all HCs. Meanwhile, CS chooses a HC ∈ HCs randomly, represented by HC , and sends < AEP (CS) > to HC .
• Step-2: Intermediate Values Calculation
After receiving < AEP >, HC i computes
Finally, each HC i (except HC ) sends < AEP (HC i ) > to HC .
• Step-3: Dominating Relationship Judgement
Once < AEP > from CS, and < AEP (HC i ) > from n − 1 HCs are received, HC maps the set {CS, HC 1 , · · · , HC n } to {0, 1, · · · , n} in order. Correspondingly, {acp
i j , · · · , acp (n) i j }. After this, HC chooses arbitrary v (v ≥ u) numbers from {0, 1, · · · , n} to construct the aggregated vector decryption set ADS, and decrypts each element in AEP through computing
where i = 1, · · · , n − 1, j = 1, · · · , t and k = 1, · · · , m. Then, through the value of (θ i j 1 , · · · , θ i j m ), HC can obtain the dominating relationship i j of Min − p and EP i j (for k = 1, · · · , m, if all |θ ijk | > N /2, HC can determine that Min − p EP i j , otherwise, Min − p and EP i j are irrelevant.). Moreover, HC computes = ( 11 , · · · , (n−1)t ), which implies the dominating relationship between Min − p and all vectors in
Finally, HC returns < > to CS.
• Step-4: Skyline Points Extraction:
Upon receiving < >, CS records Min − p as a encrypted positive skyline point in global diagnosis model. Meanwhile, CS discards Min − p and the vectors which are positive dominated by Min − p according to . After this, for the remaining vectors in EM i , i = 1, · · · , n, CS repeats step-1 to step-4 until there is no vector in EM i , i = 1, · · · , n. Finally, CS can obtain the encrypted positive points of global diagnosis EPSKY (S) = (Min − p 1 , · · · , Min − p s ), where S = S 1 ∪ · · · ∪ S n . Furthermore, through modifying the dominating relationship from positive to negative in step 1-4, Algorithm 8: HC maps {CS, HC 1 , · · · HC n } → {0, 1, · · · , n}, and chooses ADS from {1, · · · , n}; 9: HC sets temp = 0; 10: for k = 1 to k = m do 11: HC decrypts acp ijk to obtain θ ijk with ADS; 12: if |θ ijk | > N /2 then 13: HC computes temp = temp + 1 14: else 15: HC computes temp = temp − 1 16: end if 17 : end for 18: if temp = m then 19: return EP ij EP i j ; 20: else if temp = −m then 21: return EP ij EP i j ; 22: else 23: return no relationship between EP ij and EP i j ; 24: end if CS can obtain the encrypted negative points of global diagnosis EPSKY (S) = (Max − p 1 , · · · , Min − p t ). Then, the collaborative learned result EGM (encrypted global diagnosis model) can be represented as the following matrix. 11 , · · · , eg 1m · · · , · · · , · · · eg s 1 , · · · , eg s m eg ( 
Note that each element in EGM is still the ciphertext. Then, CS computes
where i = 1, · · · , t , and j = i, · · · , m, to generate EGM (CS) . Finally, CS sends the < EGM ||EGM (CS) > to all HCs.
D. COLLABORATIVE LEARNED RESULT READING
After receiving the encrypted global diagnosis model packet < EGM ||EGM (CS) >, HC i cooperatively decrypts EGM to obtain the global diagnosis model GM .
Concretely, for every element in EGM , HC i computes eg
with it distributed secret key sk H i to obtain EGM (HC i ) , and shares its EGM (HC i ) to other HCs through a secure channel. Then, the global diagnosis model can be retrieved by HC i with the follow steps.
• Step-1: Decryption Set Generation
HC i maps {CS, HC 1 , · · · HC n } to {0, 1, · · · , n} in order. Correspondingly, {EGM (CS) , EGM (HC 1 ) , · · · , EGM (HC n ) } is mapped to {EGM (0) , EGM (1) , · · · , EGM (n) }. Once the numbers of HCs, which have shared their EGM (HC) , is greater than u − 1, HC i can select v (v ≥ u) numbers from {0, 1, · · · , n} to construct the global diagnosis model decryption set GDS.
• Step-2: Collaborative Learned Result Decryption
HC i executes the follow calculations to obtain g ij , which is the plaintext of each element in EGM .
Finally, through decrypting each elements in EGM with executing the above steps, all HCs can obtain PKY (S) = {G 1 , · · · , G s }, and NKY (S) = {G s +1 , · · · , G t } to achieve the final global skyline diagnosis model GM , which is presented as follows. 11 , · · · , g 1m · · · , · · · , · · · g s 1 , · · · , g s m g (s +1)1 , · · · , g (s +1)m · · · , · · · , · · · g t 1 , · · · , g t m
Correctness of PCML:
The key point of proposed PCML is to extract the positive/negative skyline points from HCs' local diagnosis models over ciphertexts, which can be verified as following.
Theorem 1: Min-p/Max-p is the positive/negative skyline point in EM i , i = 1, · · · , n.
Proof: For simplicity, we take Min-p as an example. Assume that there is another point
. It means p 1 ≤ p ij1 , · · · , p m ≤ p ijm , and at least there exists one dimension k such that p k < p ijk . then, EP will be the vector corresponding to the minimum value in (mdp 11 , · · · , mdp nt ), which contradicts the definition of Min-p. Therefore, it can be claimed that Min-p is the positive skyline point in EM i , i = 1, · · · , n. Moreover, through modifying the dominating relationship from positive to negative, we can prove that Max-p is the negative skyline point in EM i , i = 1, · · · , n. Theorem 2: SMVC can correctly compute the dominating relationships of two vectors over ciphertexts.
Proof:
We describe the process of determining the dominating relationship of two vectors in PCML as algorithm SMVC, and verify the correctness of SMVC as follows.
First, based on the homomorphism of paillier cryptosystem, given m ∈ Z N , we have the following characteristic of [[m] ].
Then, we take
as inputs, and calculate equation (3) as follows.
Moreover, in equation (4), since the number of elements in ADS is greater than the threshold u, with shamir's secret sharing [21] , θ ijk can be calculated as follows.
Note that the bit-lengths of r c and N are α/2 and 2α, respectively, and the value of medical data is not big, thus, it is obvious that SMVC satisfied the constraints r c · (2(p ijk − p i j k ) + 1) < N /2 while p ijk > p i j k . Therefore, if |θ ijk | > N /2, it can be realized that p ijk < p i j k , and if |θ ijk | < N /2, it can be realized that p ijk ≥ p i j k . Finally, the dominating relationship of vectors EP ij and EP i j can be concluded.
E. SCALABILITY DISCUSSION
In PCML, we can see that the distributed secret key for each healthcare center is generated independently. That is, when a healthcare center participates the system, TA can generate a new distributed secret key for the healthcare center. Moreover, based on the fault-tolerant mechanism, even if a few healthcare centers are crashed, the collaborate computing process can also be executed normally. Therefore, it can be seen that the proposed scheme is scalable and flexible.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed PCML. Specifically, following the security requirements discussed earlier, our analysis focuses on how to preserve the private medical information during the collaborative model learning process.
Theorem 3: PCML achieves the privacy of HCs' local diagnosis models LMs and the confidentiality of global diagnosis model GM against honest-but-curious model [17] . (i.e., CS wants to obtain the underlying plaintext of EMs and EGM for stealing HCs' local diagnosis model LMs and the global diagnosis model GM , meanwhile, HCs expect to achieve each other's local skyline diagnosis models).
Proof: We illustrate that both HC's LMs and GM can be well protected during different phases of collaborative model learning.
• In the local diagnosis model encryption phase, all elements in NSKY (S i ) and PSKY (S i ) are encrypted with the public key PK = N , and a local skyline diagnosis model LM i is transformed to EM i by its owner via computing [[p ijk ]] = g p ijk · r N ijk mod N 2 , where j = 1, · · · , t, and k = 1, · · · , m. Note that N is the public key of paillier cryptosystem with threshold decryption, and the corresponding secret key SK is splitted into n + 1 distributed secret keys sk C , sk H 1 , · · · , sk H n for CS and HCs by TA. Since a sole distributed key sk cannot retrieve the ciphertext [[p ijk ]], therefore, it is impossible for CS and a individual HC i to decrypt the EMs. Moreover, since mdp ij is the sum of elements in vector p ijk , CS cannot retrieve the elements of p ijk with mdp ij . Thus, the privacy of LMs can be well protected in this phase.
• In the collaborative model learning phase, CS aggregates the encrypted vectors of EMs with the homomorphic characteristic of paillier cryptosystem to obtain the dominating relationship of vectors. In this process, only all HCs partially decrypt the acp i j k , HC can retrieve the θ ijk to determine the dominating relationship of Min − p/Max − p and EP i j . In addition, since θ i j k = L(θ i j k ) = r c · (2(p ijk − p i j k ) + 1) mod N , where r c is a random number which is only known by CS, and CS makes the order of k and j chaotic, thus, it is impossible for the HC to obtain the original data of LMs, or infer the size relationship of two compared tuples in a specific dimension. In other words, HC can only obtain the dominating relationship Min − p/Max − p and EP i j , which is valueless for HC but necessary for the entire process of collaborative model learning. Thus, during this phase, the privacy of LMs can be verified. In addition, due to all operations in CS are over ciphertext, CS finally obtain the encrypted global diagnosis model EGM , which can only be decrypted by HCs. Therefore, the confidentiality of GM is guaranteed.
• In the collaborative learned result reading phase, note that all HCs decrypt the EGM distributedly, and each HC i shares its partially decryption result EGM (HC i ) . Meanwhile, EGM can only be retrieved while the number of HCs participating in the decryption is greater the threshold, thus, it is impossible for an individual HC i ∈ HCs to decrypt the final global diagnosis earlier than other HCs, which guarantees that all HCs can obtain the final global diagnosis model.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of the proposed PCML in terms of the computation complexity of HCs and CS. Then, we implement PCML and deploy it with a medical machine learning dataset to evaluate its integrated performance.
A. EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT
In order to measure the integrated performance, we implement PCML on PCs with real medical datasets. Specifically, the test PCs are with 2.2 GHz six-core processor, 8 GB RAM, Windows 10, are chosen to evaluate CS and HCs, which are connected through 802.11g WLAN. Moreover, we set the bit-length of public key N is 800, and compare our PCML with the Paillier Cryptosystem-based Privacypreserving Skyline Computation (PC-based PPSKY) [8] . The real medical datasets, which are from the UCI machine learning repository called Thyroid Disease Data (TDD) Set [22] and Heart Disease Data (HDD) Set [23] , are selected to verify the effectiveness of PCML. Moreover, HDD are experimented on PCML and PC-based PPSKY to evaluate the performance of computation and communication. In detail, TDD total has 3175 tuples with 15 attributes, and HDD total has 898 tuples with 75 attributes. We choose 6 attributes which are non-boolean data in TDD, and 8 attributes that may closely related to heart diseases (such as age, blood pressure, serum cholesterol, etc.) in HDD for our simulation.
B. ACCURACY EVALUATION
In order to verify the effectiveness of PCML, we choose 3 subsets from TDD and HDD, respectively, to simulate the clinical datasets of 3 HCs. Meanwhile, we generate the local skyline diagnosis models (LM 1 , LM 2 and LM 3 ), and learn a global diagnosis model (GM ) with the three local diagnosis models. In detail, each selected subset has 900 tuples with 6 attributes in TDD, and each selected subset has 200 tuples with 8 attributes in HDD. Moreover, we choose other 150 tuples from TDD and HDD, respectively, for testing the diagnostic accuracy of LMs and the GM . In TABLE 2, we record the number of positive/negative skyline points in LMs/GM , and the diagnostic accuracy. From the table, it can be seen that the diagnostic accuracy of global diagnosis model is much higher than local diagnosis models, therefore, with PCML, the quality of online medical diagnosis service can be greatly improved.
C. COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY
The proposed PCML can offer privacy-preserving collaborative model learning for healthcare centers, we evaluate PCML in the computation complexity of CS and HCs. For simplicity, we use HC to present a normal HC i ∈ HCs for distinguishing with the HC which handles some extra operations. Specifically, assume that the dimension of vectors VOLUME 7, 2019 and the threshold are n and t, respectively. For comparing two vector, CS takes 4n multiplication and 6n exponentiation to aggregate the vectors. In addition, 2n multiplication and 3n exponentiation are taken by HC to encrypt the original data and partially decrypt the aggregated vector. Moreover, t 2 (t − 1)n multiplications will be taken to recover the aggregated vector by HC , or to retrieve the encrypted vector in the final learned result by HC. Denote that the multiplication operation and the multiplication operation are C m and C e , the total computation of CS, HC and HC are 4n * C m +6n * C e , n(t 3 −t 2 +2) * C m +3n * C e , and 2n(t 3 −t 2 +1) * C m +3n * C e , respectively.
Different from other schemes, the proposed PCML achieves privacy-preserving, multi-party model learning, high-efficiency and fault tolerate simultaneously (as shown in TABLE 3), for comparing with PCML, we select PC-based PPSKY, which is a two-part diagnosis model learing scheme relies on random permutation, 0-coding and 1-coding technique, and paillier cryptosystem. Assume that the maximum length of the binary vector which converted from original data is l, and the hash operation is C h , then, For comparing two vectors in PC-based PPSKY, the computation of CS and HC are 4n(2s+s 2 ) * C e +4ns 2 * C m , and 24n * C e +8n * C m +4 * C h , respectively. Table 4 presents the comparison of PCML and PC-based PPSKY. We can clearly see that our proposed PCML can achieve privacy-preserving collaborative model learning with lower complexity. The factor mainly impacting the computation overhead of CS, and HCs during the collaborative model learning process is the number of points in medical dataset and the dimension of vectors, in Fig. 5(a) , we plot the total running time of two-party diagnosis model learning of PCML and PC-based PPSKY with the same dimension and different number of the points. Concretely, both the datasets use 3 dimensions for testing, one of the HC uses 100 points and the number of points in another database varies from 100 to 350. From the figure, we can see that the total running time of PC-based PPSKY and PCML both increases with the number of points. However, the total running time of the PC-based PPSKY is much higher than our PCML. For testing the integrated computation overhead of PCML, we adopt that the number of HCs is 5, and in order to achieve the fault-tolerant mechanism, we set that the threshold is 4. Fig. 5 (b) to (d) show the average running time of CS and HCs varying with the sum of local skyline diagnosis model points from 350 to 600, and dimension from 4 to 8, it can be clearly seen that the time of collaborative diagnosis model learning is available with real medical dataset. As a result, the above analysis of computation complexity is verified, and our proposed PCML can be applied in the real environment.
D. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
In PCML, during the local diagnosis model encryption phase, all HCs first submits their encrypted local model < EM i ||MDP i >, i = 1, · · · , n to CS. Then, in the process of collaborative model learning phase, CS sends the encrypted aggregated vector < AEP >, and the partially decrypted aggregated vector < AEP (CS) > to HC and HC , respectively. Later on, for decrypting the aggregated vector, HC sends their partially decrypted aggregated vector < AEP (HC i ) > to HC , and HC returns the dominating relationship of vectors < > to CS. Finally, in the collaborative learned result reading phase, CS sends the encrypted global diagnosis model < EGM ||EGM (CS) > to HCs, and each HC shares its EGM (HC) with other HCs. In the real environment, we record the size of these packets, and compare the total communication overhead with PC-based PPSKY in one round. Similar to computation complexity, The factor impacting the computation overhead among CS and HCs is the number of points in medical dataset and the dimension of vectors. Therefore, in Fig. 6(a) , we set that one of the HC uses 100 points, and the number of points in another database varies from 100 to 350, the figure shows that with the increasing number of points, the communication overhead of PC-based PPSKY significantly increases and it is much higher than that of PCML. Furthermore, in Fig. 6(b) to (d) , we adopt that the number of HCs is 5, and the threshold is 4. The figures plot the integrated communication overhead of PCML varying with the sum of local diagnosis model points from 350 to 600 and the dimension from 4 to 8, it can be clearly seen that the communication overhead is acceptable among CS and HCs in practice. In conclusion, our proposed PCML can achieve better efficiency in terms of communication overhead in CS and HCs.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly discuss some related works on distributed skyline computation and privacy-preserving techniques.
Skyline computation. Recently, skyline computation has received considerable attention in the database research community. Borzsonyi et al. [7] first presented the conception of skyline computation with algorithms called Block Nested Loop (BNL) and Divide and Conquer (DC). Thereafter, many improved skyline computation schemes have been proposed. Papadias et al. [27] developed branch-and-bound skyline (BBS) based on nearest-neighbor search, which can be implemented simply in practice, and support all types of progressive processing. Zhang et al. [28] proposed an efficient approach to compute the skyline set using balanced partitioning, which overcomes the limitation of balancing partitioned subspaces. Lee and Huang [29] treated both dominance and incomparability as key factors in skyline computation, and proposed an algorithm named BskyTree, which outperformed traditional skyline algorithms up to two orders of magnitude. The above mentioned skyline schemes are centralized, and these schemes cannot be directly used in the distributed environment. Aiming at distributed scenarios, Vlachou et al. [14] addressed the efficient computation of subspace skyline queries in large-scale peer-to-peer networks, where the dataset is horizontally distributed across the peers. Specifically, based on a super peer architecture, the authors presented a threshold based algorithm, called SKYPEER, which can reduce the amount of transferred data significantly. Valkanas and Papadopoulos [15] proposed an adaptive skyline computation algorithm towards controlling the degree of parallelism and the required network traffic, in contrast to state-of-the-art methods, the proposed algorithm handles efficiently diverse preferences imposed on attributes. These schemes improved the efficiency of skyline computation, but few of them considered the data security issues.
Privacy-preserving techniques. Homomorphic encryption techniques are usual methods to achieve data operations over encrypted data without decrypting it, which can be used in privacy-preserving medical data mining. Concretely, Rahulamathavan et al. [5] proposed a privacy-preserving decision support system based on Gaussian kernel support vector machine (SVM) and paillier cryptosystem, which achieves that the patients' data can remain in encrypto form at all times. Liu et al. [2] used paillier to constructed a new cryptographic tool with additive homomorphic characteristic, and protected the sensitive medical data of users via naive Bayesian classifier over ciphertext. Kacabas and Soyata [30] presented a novel medical cloud computing approach that eliminates privacy concerns associated with the cloud provider. The proposed approach capitalizes on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), which enables computations on private health information without actually observing the underlying data. However, high time-consuming operations are required in the most privacy-preserving schemes based on homomorphic encryption, which brings heavy computation overhead. Traditional anonymization techniques are widely used in privacy-preserving schemes such as k-anonymity and l-diversity. Belsis and Pantziou [31] presented a privacy-preserving architecture built upon the concept of k-anonymity, which allows to protect user's privacy by making an entity indistinguishable from other k similar entities. Shin et al. [32] proposed a novel k-member cluster seed selection algorithm based on the closeness centrality to provide consistent information loss and reduce the information distortion. Nevertheless, these anonymization techniques bring heavy communication overhead in the real environment. Furthermore, some novel privacy-preserving data mining techniques have been presented. Arefin and Morimoto [33] expanded the traditional skyline query to skyline sets queries in parallel fashion from distributed databases to protect an individual'a privacy. Liu et al. [8] introduced an efficient secure multi-party computation (SMC) protocol, with which the privacy-privacy skyline computation across domains can be achieved.
Different from above works, our PCML scheme aims at efficiency and privacy issues. Based on paillier cryptosystem with threshold decryption and distributed skyline computation, we develop an efficient and privacy-preserving collaborative model learning scheme for online medical system. In particular, our proposed PCML can protect healthcare centers' local diagnosis models as well as ensure the confidentiality of the final global diagnosis model, and can be easily implemented in the real environment because of its high efficiency.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel privacy-preserving collaborative model learning scheme for online medical diagnosis system, called PCML. Based on paillier cryptosystem with threshold decryption and distributed skyline computation, multiple healthcare centers can securely learn a more accurate global diagnosis model with their local diagnosis models in the assistance of cloud, meanwhile, the confidentiality of the final global diagnosis model can be ensured. Specifically, before being sent to the cloud, all of the local diagnosis models are encrypted by their owner, and calculated without decryption during the collaborative model learning process. Therefore, HCs cannot obtain each other's private medical data, and CS cannot achieve any private information of HCs, as well as the final global diagnosis model. Furthermore, with threshold decryption technique, the fault-tolerant mechanism is also achieved in our scheme. Detailed security analysis shows its security strength and privacy-preserving ability, and extensive experiments were conducted to demonstrate its efficiency.
